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Abstract 
Micro-econometric evidence reveals high private returns to education, most 
prominently in low-income countries. However, it is disputed to what extent this 
translates into a macro-economic impact. This paper projects the increase in human 
capital from higher education in Malawi and uses a dynamic applied general 
equilibrium model to estimate the resulting macroeconomics impact. This is 
contingent upon endogenous adjustments, in particular how labour productivity 
affects competitiveness and if this in turn stimulates exports. Choice among labour 
market assumptions and trade elasticities results in widely different outcomes. 
Appraisal of such policies should consider not only the impact on human capital 
stocks, but also adjustments outside the labour market. 
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1.  Introduction 
A well-known empirical conundrum is that micro and macro impacts of education 
are not consistent (Pritchet 2001). The earning benefits of education to individuals 
when aggregated are typically larger than the economy-wide impact found in macro 
data. This has been flagged up as one of the major gaps in education economics 
(Psacharopoulos & Patrinos, 2004) and fostered a degree of scepticism about the 
macroeconomic contribution of education (Benahabib & Spiegel 1994, Pritchett 
2001). Significant efforts have gone into explaining this via statistical/measurement 
issues (Hanusheck & Woessman 2008, Krueger & Lindahl 2001, McMahon 2000, 
Schoellman 2012). However, as Sianesi & van Reenen (2003) point out, less attention 
has been given to the transmission mechanism from a micro to macro impact. 
Increasing access to education could be particularly important for low income 
countries, given the high marginal returns found in labour market data. However, as 
Chirwa & Matita (2009) point out, it is often perceived as a luxury in this context. 
Therefore, it is important both from academic and policy perspectives, to understand 
under what conditions the individual benefits of education are transformed into an 
economy-wide impact. 
 
Looking at existing evidence (summarised in the next section) it is clear that 
signalling effects and measurement issues are insufficient to explain the gap between 
the individual-level benefit of education and the macroeconomic impact. Therefore 
we focus on the transmission mechanism from the labour market to the wider 
economy and the extent to which this is likely to account for the micro-macro 
mismatch. The analysis is carried out for Malawi, a small country in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. We draw on comprehensive information on returns to education in self-
employment from the 2004/05 national household survey (Matita & Chirwa 2009) to 
calibrate the change in human capital following an increase in the number of higher 
education graduates in the labour market as a change in effective labour supply1. A 
dynamic applied general equilibrium model is used to simulate endogenous 
adjustments and the resulting macroeconomic impact2. Malawi is a good case study 
due to the availability of detailed labour market analysis and a 2007 Social 
Accounting Matrix (SAM) constructed by Douillet et al (2012).   
 
Simulations are carried out under a combination of two common labour market 
specifications and two sets of parameter estimates for the price sensitivity of exports, 
as used by the World Bank and the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP). Under 
these assumptions the projected increase in human capital results in widely divergent 
                                                 
1 For simplicity the focus here is on higher education, but the approach can be applied to any stage of the 
education system. 
2 This is similar to the approaches used by Giesecke & Madden (2006) for Tasmania and Hermannsson et al 
(2014) for Scotland. 
2 
 
macro impacts. The outcome is driven by the trade mechanism, but exacerbated by 
the labour market specification. Therefore, we argue that studying labour market 
issues in isolation is insufficient to determine the development impact of human 
capital policies, but that analyses need to incorporate the micro-macro transmission 
mechanism. 
 
The next section summarises previous research. The third section illustrates the 
projection of the human capital stock. The fourth presents the modelling strategy 
and macroeconomic data used. The fifth section presents and discusses the results. 
Brief conclusions are presented in the sixth section. Model details are outlined in 
appendix. 
 
2. Wage premia as indicator of labour productivity 
An extensive microeconometric literature documents the rates of return to education 
at various levels of schooling, in different countries at different times3. These studies 
reveal a clear association between education and wages, typically finding high returns 
in low income countries (see Psacharopoulous & Patrinos, 2004, for a survey). For 
instance, graduates in Malawi earn approximately three times as much as those with 
primary qualifications (Chirwa & Matita, 2009, Table 3, p. 12). 
 
Due to an inability to conduct controlled experiments in the field, verifying the 
causality between education and income is difficult. Interpreted in the spirit of the 
human capital school (Becker 1964, Mincer 1958, Schultz 1960) education directly 
increases human capital, which in turn increases the productivity of workers. An 
alternative view is motivated by the theory of signalling and screening (Arrow 1973, 
Spence 1973, Stiglitz 1975), which maintains that in extremis education does not 
enhance human capital (and as a consequence productivity), but simply serves the 
purpose of revealing innate ability to employers (for an overview see Brown & 
Sessions 2004). A range of statistical approaches have been applied to address this 
conundrum, such as utilising natural experiments (Krueger & Lindahl 2001, Card 
2001) and controlling for fixed effects using twin samples (Bonjour et al 2003, 
McMahon 2009 Appendix A). The weight of evidence suggests education affects 
income per se but is not just a proxy for unobserved ability (Blundell et al 2005, Card 
1999, 2001, Harmon & Walker 2003) and that there is a role for signalling, but of 
modest magnitude relative to overall impacts (Lange & Topel, 2006). The empirical 
evidence is mainly from market employment in high income countries. However, 
drawing on the link between education and output in self-employment can be more 
representative for low income countries (Joliffe 2004, Soon 1987) and has the added 
                                                 
3 Psacharopoulous & Patrinos (2004) summarise the results of more than 80 studies of the micro-level returns to 
education. Card (2001) and Harmon & Walker (2003) survey the evidence and discuss how it should be 
interpreted. For an overview of recent work pertaining specifically to Africa see Barouni & Brocke (2014). 
3 
 
benefit of circumventing the influence of labour market signalling (Heywood & Wei 
2004). 
 
Matita & Chirwa (2009) analyse the productivity of the self-employed by level of 
education for several occupations in Malawi, based on the 2004-05 integrated 
household survey (NSO, 2005). They find higher education to have a varying impact 
depending on occupation. The least impact is on Maize growers, which are on 
average 68% more productive than those with primary qualifications (Table 2, p. 15), 
while tobacco growers are 136% more productive (Table 3, p. 16). The biggest 
impact is for enterprise earnings, where self-employed graduates earn more than 3 
times that of those with primary school qualifications (Table 4, p. 18). On average 
self-employed graduates earn about 2.5 times that of those with primary 
qualifications. Conversely, for market employment (Chirwa & Matita, 2009) 
graduates earn about 3 times that of those with primary qualifications. If the 
difference between the two estimates is interpreted as a signalling effect this would 
suggest the wage premia of graduates in market employment, overstates the 
productivity benefits of higher education by about 20%4.  
 
In a growth accounting exercise, an increase in the education adjusted labour supply 
would simply mean more inputs into the labour component of the production 
function, which in turn would suggest more output. The causal mechanism is clear in 
principle, but rests on strong assumptions. However, macroecometric studies based 
on cross country regression have provided mixed results on the impact of education 
and some authors are highly sceptical (Benhabib & Spiegel 1994). Sianesi & Van 
Reenen (2003) survey over 20 macro growth regressions and argue that overall these 
support the qualitative notion that human capital stimulates growth, but in light of 
methodological complications they urge caution in quantifying the magnitude of such 
links.  
 
Even if signalling modifies the individual productivity benefit of education, the direct 
productivity stimulus as captured in self-employment data is still large. The question 
remains how does this productivity stimulus translate into a macroeconomic impact 
and can endogenous adjustments in that process be sufficient to account for the 
mismatch between empirical observations of micro and macro impacts of education? 
 
                                                 
4 This is a larger signalling effect than found in high income countries where it is taken to be around 10%. See 
Hermannsson et al (2014, Section 2.2) for a discussion of the evidence for high income countries. 
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3. Human capital projection 
The stock of human capital is calculated following a standard approach from growth 
accounting, where supply of labour at different skill levels is aggregated into a single 
stock of human capital, constructed as efficiency units of labour. Following 
Acemoglu & Autor (2012), for two types of labour unskilled (N) and skilled (H) the 
human capital stock in efficiency units can be presented as: 
 
𝑍 = 𝑁 + 𝜔𝐻
𝜔𝑁
𝐻 = 𝑁 + 𝜔𝐻 
 
where 𝜔𝐻 is the wage of high skill workers, 𝜔𝑁 is the wage of unskilled workers and 
𝜔 = 𝜔𝐻 𝜔𝑁�  is the wage premium of high skill workers. 
 
Figure 1 Projected effective labour supply: %-change from base year as a result of increases in 
the share of graduates in the labour market.  
 
Population and human capital stocks are fixed, except for graduates from higher 
education, which enter the labour market at the rate of graduation exhibited by the 
higher education system in 2004. Every time period the oldest age cohort of workers 
retires. This contains a smaller share of tertiary graduates than the new cohorts. 
Gradually over time the human capital stock (expressed in efficiency units) increases 
until it reaches a steady state where the number of tertiary graduates entering the 
labour market equals the number of those retiring. Parameters are informed by the 
work of Matita & Chirwa (2009) on the return to education among the self-
employed, discussed in the previous section. The least skilled workers equal one 
efficiency unit, whereas the wage premium of graduates with tertiary education 
makes them equivalent to 4.18 efficiency units. This indicates a significant 
productivity differential between the least skilled and the most skilled. However the 
base of tertiary skilled workers is very small (0.4%) so the overall impact is modest – 
a 0.29% long run increase in effective labour supply. This process is illustrated in 
Figure 1.  
 
4. Modelling approach 
An applied general equilibrium model with forward looking agents is used to estimate 
the macroeconomic impact that results from the increase in the human capital stock. 
This is derived from a typical neoclassical, one sector closed-economy model (Abel 
& Blanchard (1983), where investment decisions follow a Tobin’s q adjustment 
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(Tobin, 1969) and are separated from savings decisions. Our Applied General 
Equilibrium model for Malawi extends this skeletal model. It is solved numerically as 
an open economy-model, where the Rest of World (ROW) is considered exogenous 
and trade is price sensitive.  The labour market is characterized by imperfect 
competition where adjustments are obtained through changes in the unemployment 
rate. Furthermore, it contains a multi-sectoral dimension. It is configured for 18 
sectors (see Table A2 in Appendix) and three domestic institutions: households, 
firms and government. Details of the model are presented in Appendix and model 
code is available for download5. The model is calibrated using s Social Accounting 
Matrix (SAM) for the year 2007 (Douillett et al, 2012).  
 
The simulation invokes a Harrod neutral productivity change, i.e. an increase in 
effective labour supply which progresses from 0.007% in the first period to 0.29% in 
the long run, as reported in the previous section6. The analysis focusses on two 
contingencies in the transmission from a micro level increase in human capital to 
macro level output; the extent to which increased labour productivity affects 
competitiveness; and the degree to which competitiveness stimulates exports. To this 
end a comparison is made between the impacts of human capital under two 
commonly applied labour market assumptions. Firstly we invoke a wage curve 
(Blanchflower & Oswald, 1995), where the real wage responds to the local rate of 
unemployment. This is frequently used for high income countries but empirical work 
suggests (e.g., Hoddinott, 1996) it is appropriate for low income countries such as 
Malawi. Second, for comparison we impose a fixed nominal wage. This is a stylised 
assumption and unlikely to hold in the long-run. However, it can be motivated as an 
approximation of a situation where labour supply is very flexible, such as when a 
large share of the population is occupied in subsistence activities, as is the case for 
many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. Furthermore, this gives an indication of the 
sensitivity to labour market conditions, which are an important transmission 
mechanism from labour productivity to competitiveness. In addition, the model is 
solved using two alternative parameter estimates for the price sensitivity of exports. 
The higher elasticity (4) was estimated for the World Bank Linkage model and the 
lower one (3) for the Global Trade Analysis Project GTAP (Andersson & Martin, 
2006, Table 12A.2, p. 392). 
 
5. Simulation Results 
Key results from the simulations are presented in Table 1. These are expressed as 
percentage change from base year values and should be interpreted as showing the 
                                                 
5 http://dx.doi.org/10.5525/gla.researchdata.188  
6 More formally, this occurs as a an increase of the coefficient A in equation A6 
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outcome as compared to what would have occurred without the efficiency increase. 
The first two columns report results obtained under Real Wage Bargaining (RWB), 
whilst the last two columns show results under Fixed Nominal Wage (FNW). We 
shall first explain the long-run and short-run results obtained under RWB, before 
taking a look at the impact of adopting a FNW labour market closure, the time path 
of adjustment and the influence of varying the trade elasticities.  
 
In a simple growth accounting setup, the change in output can be calculated as the 
percentage change in labour productivity weighted by the share of labour in base-year 
GDP (47% in our SAM). In the long run this implies a 0.138% increase in GDP 
(0.47×0.00294=0.00138). However, in a general equilibrium framework, the change 
in output is not only driven by the productivity shock but also by relative changes in 
the price of output, which in turn affect competitiveness (Adams & Parmenter 1994, 
Hermannsson et al. 2014). 
 
Looking at the second column of Table 1 we indeed see that, in the long run, real 
GDP increases by 0.356% relative to base year7. A significantly larger impact than 
that implied by growth accounting. Moving down the second column we see that the 
Consumer Price Index is down by 0.071% from the base year. This occurs as the 
increase in labour productivity means more output can be produced with the same 
level of labour inputs (in natural units), thereby putting downward pressure on 
commodity prices.  
 
Table 1. Simulation results. Short run (SR) and long run (LR) impacts under 
Real Wage Bargaining (RWB) and Fixed Nominal Wage (FNW) (%-change 
from base year). 
 
This, in-turn, generates an increase in competitiveness which, given the relative price 
sensitivity of external trade in our model, is translated into an export stimulus 
amounting to 0.116% relative to base year. As the downward pressure on prices 
boosts real income, this encourages household consumption. Similarly, lower prices 
stimulate investments. Capital stock accumulates with investment until the new 
steady-state is achieved and results show that the capital stock has grown by 0.416% 
relative to base year. This occurs as the investment rate in the model is positively 
linked to the shadow price of capital. As the Replacement Cost of Capital has fallen 
(-0.159%) additional investment occurs until the return to capital has also been 
                                                 
7 The long run is when the capital stock has fully adjusted to the change in productivity. This is reached in period 
100 when steady-state conditions are imposed. Capital stock is at its optimum level, with rental rates equal to user 
cost of capital. In the model the supply of land is fixed in each period. However, we allow economic activities to 
compete for space through a flexible price of land. Population (identified in the model as working age population) 
is fixed. However, there is labour mobility among sectors. 
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reduced to bring about a new steady state. As reported in Figure 2 the efficiency 
stimulus generates a positive impact in all sectors.  
 
The same principles apply in the short run. However, the situation is more 
complicated given the forward looking nature of the model, as agents respond to 
anticipated events and bring forward consumption expenditures. In the general case, 
as demonstrated by Adams & Parmenter (1994), short-run impacts of efficiency gains 
have an ambiguous effect. Although, more output can now be produced for any 
given level of inputs, it is not clear a priori whether this will lead to increased output 
or a reduction in the level of inputs, until long-run adjustments restore equilibrium. 
Hermannsson et al. (2014) analyse such a situation for the case of human capital and 
indeed find that increased efficiency can lead to a reduction in employment, in the 
short run. 
 
Figure 2 The long-run output impact on individual sectors under the RWB closure. 
 
In the short-run, which corresponds to the first period of the model, we assume 
capacity constraints. Therefore capital stock is fixed at its base year values and the 
initial distribution across sectors is also maintained. As can be seen from column 1 of 
Table 1, GDP increases slightly with respect to the initial steady-state. In this time 
frame, the increase in efficiency coincides with an increase in employment reflecting 
agents’ forward looking expectations8. If we were to run the model based on myopic 
agents, employment would fall in the first period, so that, given fixed labour supply, 
unemployment would rise putting downward pressure on real wages. However, with 
perfect foresight agents, we have an anticipated effect according to which 
unemployment falls by 0.228% while real wages rise by 0.023% as reported in Table 
1. The short run GDP impact of 0.01% is still higher than what we would expect in a 
typical growth accounting set up (0.47×0.007%=0.0035%). Although exports are 
falling, increase in output is driven by anticipation effects of the perfect foresight 
agents9.  
 
                                                 
8 This refers to employment in natural units, whereas the change in employment in efficiency unit is given by the 
change in natural units plus the change in efficiency. However, labour productivity increases can reduce 
employment. For a more comprehensive discussion of this point see Adams & Parmenter (1994). 
9 This is naturally not the case if agents adopt adaptive expectations. The short-run GDP impact when the model 
is run with myopic expectation equates to 0.0027% which is, as we would expect, similar and in this case lower 
than the growth accounting approach. The structure of the myopic model is similar to the forward looking model 
described in Appendix. The differences are in consumption and investment. In the myopic model, consumption 
is a linear function of real disposable income and contrary to the perfect foresight case, consumers preserve, in 
each period, stability between current consumption and wealth. As for Investment, the adjustment rule 
introduced in the myopic model is such that investments are determined as a fraction of the gap between the 
desired and actual level of capital stocks adjusted for depreciation. 
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With fixed nominal wage, workers are not sensitive to the excess demand for labour. 
In our model the labour market plays an important role in influencing price 
behaviour. Therefore, the labour market assumption adopted is likely to influence 
competitiveness effects. The changes in GDP, employment and consumption are 
greater compared to the case of real wage bargaining in both the short run and the 
long run. For both labour market closures, the change in employment is greater than 
the change in GDP in the short-run. This means that the capital/labour ratio falls in 
this period, whereas in the long-run the capital/labour ratio increases. This occurs as 
the increase in labour efficiency increases return to capital and investment is 
stimulated as a consequence. 
 
The short-run impact is greater under fixed nominal wages than real wage bargaining. 
This is generated by a bigger substitution effect in favour of labour. The real wage 
falls because workers cannot influence wages, which in turn increases the demand for 
labour. With a fixed working age population the unemployment rate decreases by 
3.7% from base year values. In the long-run, with total adjustment in capital stock, 
the nominal wage rigidity provides an additional improvement in competitiveness 
generated by a bigger fall in prices, which stimulates export demand for local goods. 
Ultimately, it is the greater increase in exports that drives the stronger long-run 
impact under the fixed nominal wage. 
 
The results in Table 1 show that competitiveness effects are a key element in realising 
the macroeconomic impact of human capital. Therefore, it is important to consider 
the sensitivity of the impact to different estimates of the trade elasticity. Figure 3 
reports the period by period percentage change in GDP obtained by performing the 
same shock described above but varying the trade elasticity. For both labour market 
closures an increase in the trade elasticity provides a bigger increase in output. 
However, for the case of fixed nominal wage we observe a dramatic increase in GDP 
when trade elasticities are higher compared to the case where wage bargaining is 
adopted.  
 
This suggests that if wages are flexible and depend on the excess demand for labour, 
the impact of a labour productivity shock is less responsive to change in trade 
elasticity compared to a situation of wage rigidity. The competitiveness effects, under 
RWB, are partially offset by an increase in wage income. We should clarify that these 
results are the consequence of maintaining the labour supply fixed. Indeed, this 
would not occur if the Malawi economy was able to attract skilled migrants. In this 
case migration would put downward pressure on wages thus increasing 
competitiveness effects thereby potentially making the change in economic activity 
greater under the RWB closure than under the FNW closure. Conversely, the 
competitiveness effect is conditional on the assumption that labour efficiency is 
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improving in Malawi relative to the rest of the World (ROW). If the ROW is 
experiencing similar increases in productivity, the competitiveness advantages would, 
of course be muted (but offsetting what would otherwise be a decline in 
competitiveness). 
 
Figure 3 Comparison of projected GDP changes under alternative assumptions about labour 
markets and price elasticity of exports (% change from base year). 
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper analyses the macroeconomic impact of increasing the skill level of the 
population in a low income country through higher education. The aim is to provide 
a simple demonstration of the influence of the transmission mechanism when 
estimating the macroeconomic impact of an increasing human capital stock. A 
growth accounting framework, with parameters obtained from previous 
microeconometric analysis (Matita & Chirwa, 2009), is used to determine the change 
in effective labour supply, while a general equilibrium model is used to simulate 
endogenous adjustments. This reveals that a positive outcome is driven by 
competitiveness effects boosting exports. A key transmission mechanism is the 
interaction between labour markets and trade, which makes the overall outcome 
contingent upon two steps: labour productivity increasing competitiveness and 
competitiveness stimulating exports.  
 
Interpreting the results from a policy point of view, this suggests that the 
effectiveness of human capital investment for economic development could be 
complemented by policies that affect the export elasticity by reducing trade costs, 
such as through reducing physical and institutional transport barriers (see e.g. Freund 
& Rocha 2011, Limão & Venables 2001). A further analysis of this point would 
benefit from extending the model to include a more detailed treatment of trade costs, 
adopting elements from trade-focussed models, such as the model of Malawi by 
Löfgren (2001). 
 
The results have further bearing in the context of empirical attempts to estimate the 
macroeconomic impact of education. A priori it is clear that determining the 
productivity stimulus of human capital precisely is important for the accuracy of the 
overall analysis.  However, there are significant contingencies in the micro-macro 
transmission mechanism, which are less well understood. The analysis presented here 
reveals that the macroeconomic outcome of a human capital accumulation progress 
can be affected by orders of magnitude, depending on how the increase in effective 
labour supply is transmitted and what endogenous adjustments take place in the rest 
of the economy. In the simulations presented this variability affects the scale of the 
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impact, but it is always positive. This reinforces the interpretation of the empirical 
evidence that sees a positive macroeconomic impact from increasing the skills of the 
population (Krueger & Lindahl 2001, Sianesi & Van Reenen, 2003) and refutes the 
notion that there is no impact (Benhabib & Spiegel 1994, Pritchet 2001).  
 
That said there are still a number of issues to be clarified in the details of the 
transmission mechanism. Firstly, the magnitude of the competiveness impact is very 
sensitive to labour market specification. This paper has adopted stylised assumptions, 
namely that population is fixed and that wages setting can either be described by a 
wage curve or a fixed nominal wage. Naturally, the labour market is likely to be more 
responsive in the long run. However, the fixed nominal wage can be motivated as an 
approximation of a situation where labour supply is very flexible, such as when a 
large share of the population is occupied in subsistence activities. It would be useful 
to explore the influence of an internal "migration" from subsistence to market 
activities explicitly, for example by building on the CGE-modelling of Gelan (2002). 
Furthermore, the economic impact of graduates is largely driven by increased 
competitiveness, with subsequent employment and output impacts critically 
depending on stimulus to exports. In turn, the magnitude of the impact will crucially 
depends on the labour market conditions. Naturally, in the short-run we might 
assume nominal wage unchanged however in the long run there is likely to be in 
operation a more responsive wage setting. An increase in productivity, by and of 
itself, does not improve competitiveness, unless it is greater than that of trade 
partners. This is demonstrated for the impact of demographic changes in a multi-
country analysis by Mérette & Georges (2010), but has so far not been taken into 
account when examining the economic impact of human capital. Secondly, this 
analysis only pertains to labour supply and does not allow for other supply-side 
transmission mechanisms, such as social returns and non-market private returns 
(McMahon, 2000), which are potentially very important. Finally, in order to gauge the 
per capita impacts of the education system it is important to consider its economic 
impacts in the context of demographic change. This is particularly important for low-
income countries, such as Malawi, which exhibit fast population growth. Therefore, 
it is not clear a priori whether production and retention of graduates will keep up 
with population growth to maintain a constant or growing share of graduates in the 
work force. Therefore, policy analysis would benefit from a framework that explicitly 
acknowledges population structure, such as in an Overlapping Generations (OLG) 
model. 
 
  
11 
 
Appendix: Summary of model 
This appendix elaborates on some of the features of the dynamic applied general 
equilibrium model used for simulations in this paper. Inevitably due to space 
constraints the presentation is not exhaustive, but further details of model equations 
and calibration are available upon request and the model code is available online: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.5525/gla.researchdata.188  
 
The decision problem of the representative consumer is to choose a sequence of 
consumption that maximizes the present value of utility, as summarized by the 
lifetime utility function: 
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where tC  is the consumption at time period ,t s and r  are respectively the constant 
elasticity of marginal utility and the constant rate of time preference. The dynamic 
budget constraint ensures that the discounted present value of consumption must 
not exceed total household wealth, W: 
( ) ttt
t
WCPctz ≤∑
∞
 (A2)  
where Pc is the household's aggregate consumption price index and given r the 
interest rate, ( )∏ −+=
t
trtz
11)( . Once the optimal path of consumption is obtained 
from the solution of the intertemporal problem, aggregate consumption is allocated 
between sectors through a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function. 
Household demand for local and imported goods is a result of the intra-temporal 
cost minimization problem.  
 
The path of investment is obtained by maximizing the present value of the firm’s 
cash flow (Hayashi, 1982) given by profit tπ  less private investment expenditure
10, It 
subject to the presence of adjustment cost ( )txg  where ttt KIx /= (Devarajan & Go, 
1998): 
( )
( )( )[ ]∑
∞
=
+−
+0
1
1
1
t
tttt xgIπr
  subject to  (A3)  
    
ttt KIK δ−=  (A4)  
                                                 
10 For simplicity of notation the sector index is omitted. Furthermore, variables not defined over time with the 
subscript t are assumed to be fixed throughout.  
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The solution of the dynamic problem gives the shadow price of capital, tλ and the 
time path of investment.  
 
Total gross output X, is given by combining value added (Y) and intermediate inputs 
(V) through Leontief technology:  
    
min ;t tt Y V
Y VX
a a
=  (A5)  
where aY and aV are input coefficients. Y is given by a CES combination of labour 
(N), private capital ( K ) and land, (L):  
[ ]ϑϑϑ ))(1()()( ttttt LbaNAbKaY −−++=  (A6)  
where ,i tA is an index of Harrod neutral technical change and given y  the elasticity 
of substitution ψψϑ /)1( −= . The demand for labour, capital and land is obtained 
from first order conditions. 
 
Imported and locally produced intermediate goods are considered imperfect 
substitutes and are combined under a CES function (Armington, 1969). The demand 
function for intermediate inputs derives from cost minimization. Each industry 
produces goods and services that can be exported or sold locally. An export demand 
function closes the model where foreign demand for Malawi goods (E) depends on 
the ratio between the ROW price (Pe) and the price of output (Px), and the export 
price elasticity, h : 
η






=
t
t Px
PeEE
    
 (A7)  
Government taxes labour income ( LyNτ ) and capital incomes ( KyKτ ). Its 
expenditure comprises current spending in goods and services (G), net transfer to 
households (Tr) and interest payment on debt (rD).  
    
KyLyTrGrDD KNttt ττ −−++=  (A8)  
As this application does not consider changes in natural population, labour force is 
fixed to the base year. The model is run under two specific labour market closures: 
real wage bargaining (RWB) and fixed nominal wage (FNW). Under RWB, real wage 
and unemployment are negatively related as in Blanchflower and Oswald (1995): 
13 
 
( )t
t
t uc
cpi
w ln1.0ln −=
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


    
 (A9)  
where c is a calibrated parameter, w, cpi, and u are the nominal wage, the consumer 
price index and the unemployment rate respectively. In the real wage bargaining 
regime wages are directly related to workers’ bargaining power and respond to excess 
demand for labour.  
 
The total absorption equation provides equilibrium in the commodity market. This is 
sufficient to guarantee equilibrium in the payments account since money is not 
considered as a commodity. In the capital market, capital demand equals the capital 
stock. Equilibrium in the labour markets is achieved through changes in 
unemployment rate, as the wage rate is not determined via first order conditions. 
Share parameters are obtained from the SAM while some structural and behavioural 
parameters are based on econometric estimation or best guesses. Some selected 
benchmark values are reported in Table A1. To solve an infinite time horizon model 
steady state conditions are imposed at a specific point in time. Hence the transitional 
pathway is the result of the discrete time solution of the model. 
 
Table A1. Selected benchmark values 
 
The sectoral classification of the model is reported in Table A2. We have aggregated 
the 37 sectors SAM as in Douilette, Pauw & Thurlow (2012) to a more manageable 
18 sectors. 
 
Table A.2. Economic activities in the model 
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